HomeMy WebLinkAboutCity Council Committees - Civil Services Commission - 09/11/1992 "Report of Findings" Memorandum
Vehicle Safety Review Board
VSRB Control # 92-2 / KPD Case #92-06459
To: Chief 'Ed Crawford
From: Vehicle Safety Review Board
Lt. M.Y. Sweeney (Chair)
Mr. Ken Chatwin, Risk Manager
Sgt. Glenn Woods, EVOC instructor
Date: September 11, 1992
This "Report of Findings" is submitted pursuant to Kent Police
Department (KPD) Policy K-23 . K-23 directs that the Vehicle Safety
Review Board (VSRB) , after the deliberation of facts relating to
reportable vehicular accidents, provide the Chief of Police with a
"Report of Findings" memorandum. A memorandum generally addressing
issues of causation, policy conformance, legal compliance,
training, potential sanctions, and the official categorization of
the accident pursuant to those classifications enumerated in KPD
Policy K-20.
All VSRB "Reports of Finding" are presented sequentially in format
consistent with the six (6) points of concern listed in Policy K-
. 23 . You might wish to "skip" momentarily to "Point 3"
which calls for an event synopsis and identification of persons and
vehicles involved.
Point i
The "VSRB" packet prepared by Captain Jim Miller upon'completion of
all investigative actions was sufficient in it 's content to yield
a determination by the board. officer King' s report and
presentation of witness statements was well done. The board
appreciated the willingness of both Officers King .and Mc.Vicar to
avail themselves to us for statements and questions. Their remarks
did not remarkably sway our focus or alleviate misunderstanding as
there was none -- they were simply helpful .
Point 2
The statutes and policy with some bearing in this matter and
discussed by the board are:
-- 46. 61. 035: Authorized Emergency Vehicles
-- 46. 61. 050: Obedience to Traffic Control Devices (Signals)
-- 46 . 61. 190: Right of Way
-- KPD K-09: Privileges Afforded Emergency Vehicles
Point 3
Accident Data
2 Car, Injury (to civilian driver [possible RH fracture/neck pain)
and passenger (back pain/laceration) ) . Occurred Friday, July 31,
1992 @ 1800, intersection of SB N. Washington Ave. and EB W. James
St, daylight, bright sun, hot and clear, straight and level
roadway. 4-way major intersection with signal controls. Commercial
/Multi-family district, moderately heavy, Friday, end of rush-hour
traffic. 35 m.p.h. zones. The civilian driver was Mr. John
Mangalam, a Kent apartment resident (in proximity to the accident
area) , and a 25 year old engineer.
Accident Profile
Officer McVicar driving (old-style) fully marked 1990 Caprice
patrol car stopped for a red signal in O/S, S/B lane of N.
Washington Avenue, 1st car in line at stop line, turn signal on to
turn right.
MCVicar' s attention drawn to an unidentified vehicle make a hurried
(perhaps not yielding properly) left turn from WB James to SB
Washington, squealing tires, appears above speed limit.
McVicar, under red light, looks to right (into sun at West horizon)
sees no traffic to yield to, nor any to left, turns off turn
signal, proceeds into intersection without much hesitation,
. activating emergency lights and possibly siren (siren not
clear/uncertain) at the same approximate time or moments after he
accelerates to into intersection. After crossing 3 lane widths of
travel, he is struck in RF by vehicle travelling EB in the O/S lane
of W. James. McVicar saw car coming at last moment couldn't avoid.
The civilian car was a Grey 1986 Honda Civic which a witness states
was moving at 30-35 m.p.h. on or near a yellow caution before
turning red.
Point 4
This event is categorized as an accident.
Point 5
This accident is classified by the board as Preventable.
Rationale
It is incumbent upon the operator of an emergency vehicle not to
proceed into an intersection disregarding rules of the road
governing direction, controls, stopping, turning, and standing to
do so safely -- what is safe is a judgement which will vary in
consideration of all variables in play at the time.
At a time when traffic volume at a large intersection is moderately
heavy; when views are obstructed by vehicles standing in opposing
stop and turning lanes; when the sun is inhibiting vision; when
sunlight is itself bright; when the opposing motorist was
travelling within posted limits; when the violation to be pursued
is an infraction; when there is no clear hesitance in entering the
intersection contrary to signal controls by standing with emergency
lights on and/or displaying an audible signal of your intent to
proceed; -- it is the opinion of the VSRB that an error in
judgement has been made.
RCW 46. 61. 190 states in yielding right of way that when a failure
to yield occurs "if such a driver is involved in a collision with
a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways . . . such
collision shall be prima facie evidence of his failure to yield. "
46 . 61. 035 states that the operator of an emergency vehicle when
using emergency lights and audible signals when required . . .
does not relieve the driver . . . from duty to drive with due
regard for the safety of persons, nor shall such provisions protect
the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the
safety of others. "
The board emphasizes it' s opinion that there was not reckless
disregard here -- but an omission in duty for due regard for
safety. An error in judgement in the timing, method, time of
hesitation, and degree of certainty of observation in choosing to
proceed.
We believe that the patrol car began to roll when McVicar removed
• his foot from the brake. MCVicar stated that he did not hesitate,
that he "locked on his target" and from that point the synch
between his observation of oncoming traffic, his foot hitting the
gas and his lights and siren going on is uncertain. All that is
certain is the outcome. Without recanting all witnesses statements,
which do conflict, it is proper to conclude that the lights were on
at impact, but not likely at the moment in time he proceeded into
the intersection. We speak here of an estimated 60-70 foot distance
and a moment in time. There was no clear hesitance to proceed,
clear presence of emergency lights or siren before doing so. The
witnesses in the best position to see used terms like "jetted" or
"darted" to characterize the .vehicles start from the stop line --
without seeing the emergency lighting until impact -- some did not
see lights at all others did -- after the moment of impact.
Captain Jim Miller, in his insight memo to the VSRB, summarizes all
that can be said here regarding this "moment" well . "There is
mixed testimony by witnesses as to the timing of the activation of
the emergency equipment on Officer MCVicar' s vehicle. Even if it
was activated prior to the collision, there is little evidence to
suggest that there would have been sufficient time for the other
driver to have been alerted to the danger. "
In summary, an error in judgment -- the decision how (hesitance
with lights and siren) and when to proceed (clear of danger) . This
does not appear an error in handling, driving, placement. If this
were a citizen an accident infraction would have been issued.
,,
It is the opinion of the board that audible signals, . in addition to
lights, and a several second reconfirmation of his ability to
proceed safely albeit one-lane at a time, were necessary in light
of all circumstances at the time of this collision.
Point 6
The VSRB makes three (3) recommendations based upon the individual
fact of this case:
0
1. The sanction proper to this event is: oral interview with
warning that like behavior in the future will result in more
severe discipline, and that note of such interview, warning, and
this VSRB review be noted on his evaluation consistent with
that instructed in Policy K-23 .
2 . A one-work day ride-along with EVOC Instructor Sgt. Woods for
the purpose of his observation of McVicar' s driving habits,
discussing relevant statutes, policies, and decision making.
This observation will result in a written report' by Sgt. Woods
to the Patrol Captain, documenting what was observed, discussed,
and suggesting any further training necessary relating to
judgement and driving. This report to accompany his next
performance evaluation.
3 . The intensity of discipline suggested here is based solely upon
the record of this VSRB review. Officer McVicar has had no other
accidents before this board since it ' s creation one year ago. It
is further suggested that the above two recommendations be
evaluated against other accident related records within his
personnel records -- and depending upon the content of those
records discipline of greater intensity may be warranted.
In conclusion we ask that you note that Officer McVicar was,
against his own self-interest, quite candid and direct in his
remarks and responses to questions. He admitted error, said he
would not do so again, knew he should have waited. The VSRB both
appreciates and respects his candor.
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Advisory 92-2-1: An issue of discussed at some length between VSRB
members and with Officers McVicar and King concerned the "layout"
of emergency lighting and control head switches, microphones, and
related gear in the "console area" . It was noted that some vehicles
have siren/horn rim interconnects -- whereas others do not, and in
some cases light switch mechanisms are not identical in placement.
It was for this reason that McVicar was noted by one witness to be
"leaning down" as he proceeded into the intersection -- that
witness believing that he might have been slumping due to
unconsciousness. Surely while leaning down (and apparently looking)
rather than touching through habit from a more upright position
effects one' s peripheral vision.
•
Officers drive different cars depending on availability -- and
without some assignment scheme that would be difficult to
administer, their personal familiarity with the features of
different cars and layouts is a matter of concern to the board. A
second of uncertainty in how to employ emergency lighting, sirens,
or assuming your horn rim has a siren when it doesn't poses a risk,
which when under stress, is best addressed by a habit and through
symmetry in design and layout.
We advise that by , from within the patrol division, probably
headed by the EVOC instructional staff, a report be made suggesting
a preferred and fixed layout of instrumentation, features and
interconnects, and potential costs of implementation. This work
should involve the surveying of patrol staff, contacting other
agencies, and researching possible alternatives against literature
available on the subject. If such recommendations are reasonable
and .possible in terms of cost, every effort to assure their
implementation should be made. The board believes that "ritual
consistency" in the activation of emergency equipment and controls
is one variable which could be of benefit in lessening the
likelihood of collisions and assuring the proper application of
emergency systems when needed -- overcoming the risk posed when not
activated properly.
Respectfully,
Lt. M.P. Sweene Mr.JKn Chatwin Sgt. Glenn Woods
VSRB Convened: Thursday 9/11/92 , 1200-1445, Chiefs Conference Room